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LEGAL PUBLICATIONS BOARD orNORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

OLIVER M. TOWNSEND, Case Editor

COOLING TIME - A DESIRABLE
TEST.- [Kentucky] The strict instructions and rulings of the courts
on the element of "cooling time"
in cases of homicide induced by
adequate provocation have resulted
in many unduly severe and unjust
punishments. Most courts say that
no matter how grievous the provocation may have been, if there was
time for a reasonable man to cool
his passion the offense is murder;
whether or not the passion actually
did subside is immaterial. Nevada
v. Hall, 9 Nev. 58 (1893); Nowacryk
v. People, 139 Ill. 336, 28 N. E. 961
(1891); Ragland v. State, 125 Ala.
12, 27 So. 983 (1900); In Re Farley, 3 Okla. Crim. 719, 101 Pac. 295
(1910); Holcomb v. State, 103 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 348, 281 S. W. 204
(1926).
The legislatures have realized
that a man greatly agitated and
excited by a grave provocation,
may attempt to "take the law into
his own hands," and have felt that
in the name of justice a less severe
punishment than that for murder
should be provided.
Voluntary
manslaughter statutes have been
the result. The courts, however,
appear to have unnecessarily limited this legislative intent.
Exemplary of the majority ruling
limiting cooling time to that of a

reasonable man is the case of People v. Ashland, 20 Cal. App. 168,
128 Pac. 798 (1912), wherein a conviction for murder was affirmed
against a defendant who, informed
by his wife that she had twice committed adultery with deceased, the
first time under violence, searched
for deceased and shot him seventeen hours after he had been first
informed, a sufficient time to cool
said the court. Another court in
Commonwealth v. Moore, 2 Pa. 502
(1864), held that where the defendant's wife confessed a few
hours before the homicide that she
had committed adultery with deceased, there was no ground for
holding" that the offense was manslaughter rather than murder.
There had been ample time for reflection after the defendant learned
of the adultery An extreme case
is Collins v. Florida,88 Fla. 578, 102
So. 880 (1924), where the deceased
made several improper proposals
to defendant's wife. To get away
from him defendant and wife
moved eighteen miles away. Finally, deceased visited the home of
defendant, forced the wife into his
car, drugged her and had intercourse with her. Upon learning of
this incident, defendant searched
for deceased and killed him, several
hours later. The court, although
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not disturbing the jury verdict of
manslaughter, said, ". . but in
such case the slayer cannot take
time and deliberate upon the
wrong, and then act upon an impulse to avenge the insult by taking
the life of the wrongdoer."
In the recent case of Golden v.
Commonwealth, ... Ky...., 121 S.
W. (2d) 21 (1938), it did not occur
to the defense attorney to request,
or to the trial court to give, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, this failure to do so probably
being the result of the previous
strict interpretations of "cooling
time."
In that case the defendant was
found guilty of murder in the first
degree. A trifle more than a year
previous to the killing, the deceased's brother had seduced and
gotten with child the appellant's
fifteen year old daughter. The afternoon before the homicide the
deceased, while returning the bastard child to the home of its
mother, wilfully made an indecent
exposure of his person before the
women in the house. Defendant's
efforts to stop such conduct resulted only in jeering replies and
oaths from the deceased. Appellant
was so greatly excited over the deceased's utter contempt for the
women of his family that he was
unable to sleep most of that night.
The next morning he shot deceased.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals
expressed its dissatisfaction with
the heavy penalty meted out, but
found itself handcuffed so it could
do nothing else but affirm. Evidently the court believed that this
was not a place for an instruction
on voluntary manslaughter although a conviction on that offense
would have been the answer to
what both the defense attorney and

the Court were striving for-a less
severe punishment.
The Court in State v. Holmes,
12 Wash. 169, 40 Pac. 735 (1895),
also applied the majority rule with
a great deal of hesitation. The defendant, a weak colored boy was
assaulted in a most brutal and
cowardly manner by the deceased,
a large powerful white man, who
bragged that he intended to have a
"nigger" before the day was over.
As soon as the defendant was able
to break away from the deceased,
he procured a gun and returned
and shot him. The elapsed time
between the beating and defendant's return was from ten to fifteen
minutes.
The Court said "this is a hard
case and the condition of the defendant is touching; and whether
or not, if this court had sat as
jurors in this case, we would have
felt justified in returning a verdict
of murder in the first degree is
questionable . . . ." The Court
then went on to say, that the case
having been submitted to the jury
under proper instructions, and it
being a close question under the
facts, they would not disturb the
verdict. The trial court had instructed the jury not to consider
whether the defendant did cool his
passions but whether he had time
to cool them.
A much more satisfying and just
result was reached by the Missouri Supreme Court in the case of
State v. Gruggin, 147 Mo. 39, 47 S.
W. 1058 (1898), by applying a liberal interpretation of the "cooling
time" factor. In this case the defendant was informed at nine
o'clock in the morning that his
young daughter had been raped by
the deceased, about a month previously. The defendant was deeply
affected by this incident, and at
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three o'clock that afternoon shot
The trial judge
the deceased.
charged the jury that they should
find the defendant guilty of murder, there being sufficient cooling
time. The Supreme Court reversed, saying a manslaughter
charge should have been given.
Wharton in his treatise on criminal law (12 ed., Sec. 609) succinctly states the more desirable view.
"Whether there has been cooling time is eminently a question of
fact, varying with the particular
case and the condition of the party.
provocations
There are some
which, with persons of even temperament, lose their power in a few
moments; while there are others
which rankle in the breast for days
and even weeks, producing tempoMen's temperarary insanity.
ments, also, vary greatly as to the
duration of hot blood; and it must
be remembered that we must determine the question of malice in
each case, not by the standard of
an ideal "reasonable man," but by
that of the party- to whom the
malice is imputed. Hence, whether.
there has been cooling time, so as
to impute to the defendant malice,
is to be decided not by an absolute
rule, but by the conditions of each
case."
Surely, the view as expressed by
Wharton and applied in State v.
Gruggin (supra) is much more intelligent and better serves the ends
of justice than does the view applied in the majority of the cases.
Huco KoRANDA.
CONSTRUcTION-HABITUAL

OFFENDER

STATUTES

I.
Upon conviction in the New
York State court for burglary, defendant was sentenced as a second

offender by virtue of a prior conviction in a United States District
court in New York for uttering a
counterfeit federal reserve bank
note. The state court held that
the burglary was his second crime
because his first offense, uttering a
counterfeit bill, was punishable under a state statute also. People v.
Fury, 18 N. E. (2d) 650, (N. Y.,
1939).
The habitual offender statute
under which the defendant was
sentenced, states that, "A person,
who, after having been once or
twice convicted within this state,
of a felony, of an attempt to commit a felony, or, under the laws of
any other state, government, or
country, of a crime which, if committed within this state, would be
a felony, commits any felony,
within this state, is punishable upon conviction of such second or
third offense, as follows.. ." (italics supplied). N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws
(Baldwin, 1938), PENAL LAW, sec.
881.
This statute is representative of
the ambiguity which exists in the
habitual offender statute of many
states. (CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Michie,
1935) c. 550, see. 551, MINN. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) see. 9931-1, ORE.
CODE ANN. (1930) sec. 13-2801,
UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) sec.
103-1-18) "Within this state," may
be taken to mean, within the state
boundaries, as opposed to, within
the jurisdiction of the state courts.
In People v. Gutterson, 244 N. Y.
243, 155 N. E. 113 (1926), the ambiguity in the wording of the statute was removed by qualifying it
through another of the state statutes. The holding of that case was
that a prior conviction in a federal
court for using the mails to defraud
did not bar the defendant from
being sentenced under the indeter-
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minate sentence statute. This statute provided that, "a person never
before convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in d state
prison," shall receive an indeterminate sentence (italics supplied).
N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS (Baldwin,
1938), PENAL LAW, see. 2189.
The holding of the Gutterson
case left the possible scope of sentencing under the habitual offender
statute to only those offenses,
"punishable by imprisonment in a
state prison." The principal case
extended the statute completely
over that scope by holding that the
prior conviction need not be in a
state court, providing only, that the
prior offense would have been a
felony if committed within the
jurisdiction of the state courts.
Other states having the same
type of ambiguity in their habitual
offender statute (supra), must in
the future face the same problem.
If there is no qualifying statute as
in New York, their courts may
have to decide on the merits of one
construction in preference to the
other, as a possible basis for indicating legislative intent.
Convictions under jurisdictions
other than that of the state are of
two types: 1. Convictions under
the laws of the other states. 2.
Convictions under federal laws.
The state may legislate in any
field which a sister state may. Thus,
the laws of the principal state
would be a true standard of the
legislature's attitude as to the penal
nature of a prior offense committed
under the laws of another state.
This is not true in respect to
prior federal convictions. The principal state is precluded from legislating in most of the fields which
Congress acts. Only where there
are constitutional state statutes
giving concurrent jurisdiction in
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respect to the particular type of
offense involved will the principal
state's laws be a valid standard.
But, under the broader construction of the statute, the standard is
expanded to include federal laws,
that is, within the state boundaries,
it covers the federal courts in the
state as well as the state courts.
Hence, any federal offense if committed within the state boundaries,
would be a felony in the federal
courts of the state, and fall within
the purview of the statute.
It might be said that the legislature would not desire to have all
federal offenses deemed prior convictions. This may be answered
by pointing out that there is no bar
to excluding any offense they may
so desire by subsequent statutes.
The advantage of the broader interpretation is the bringing of
federal offenses within the scope of
the state penal statutes indirectly,
which except in cases of concurrent jurisdiction statutes, could not
be done directly. Is it unreasonable to infer that the statute was
worded with the intent to protect
the state from the habitual criminal, who, though having been
convicted many times in the federal courts, is facing his first state
sentence?
The concurrent jurisdiction statute involved in the principal case
raises many other problems that as
yet have not been before the
courts. The defendant had committed the counterfeiting in New
York. Hence he may have been
tried and convicted under the New
York counterfeiting statute without
double jeapardy, United States V.
Lanza, 260 U. S. 377 (1922). The
question is then, do these two convictions for the same offense make
such an offender subject to the
second offender statute? Or, to
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carry the question one step further, will a subsequent state conviction for another act subject him
to a sentence as third offender?
It would seem that under a literal interpretation of the holding of
the principal case, the answer to
both questions would be in the affirmative.
It would seem more reasonable,
however, that the legislative intent
to get at the habitual criminal
would best be served by judging
the prior offenses by the number of
criminal acts perpetrated, as opposed to the number of convictions.
JACK JACOBS.

I".
Upon prosecution for murder,
defendant was convicted of manslaughter. Previously he had been
convicted of grand larceny in Oregon, and later was convicted of
the crime of "stealing an automobile" in Canada. Now the State
successfully obtained his conviction
as a third offender under the
Louisiana multiple offender statute.
Upon' appeal, the conviction was
amended, finding the accused guilty
as a second offender. Held: the
Canadian offense would not have
been a felony in Louisiana so cannot be considered in determining
the number of previous offenses
committed, State v. O'Day, 185 So.
290 (La. 1938).
The Canadian statute under
which the defendant was previously
convicted provides in part, "Theft
is committed when the offender
moves the thing or causes it to
move or to be moved, or begins to
cause it to become movable, with
intent to steal it," Dom. Crim.
Code, Art. 347.
From this provision it is obvious
that asportation is no longer necessary to the crime of theft in Can-

ada, and it has been so held; Henderson v. Northwestern Mutual
Fire Ass'n, 34 B. C. R. 411, 43 C.
C. C. 217 1 D. L. R. 339 (1925).
Thus, this Canadian statute covers
both the common law larceny when
asportation is necessary and a new
crime of theft. In the instant case
the court held that the crime ol
stealing an automobile, with no asportation, a felony under the Canadian code did not amount to a
felony under the Louisiana code of
Criminal Procedure (Crim. Stat.
Ann., 1932, Ch. 7, "Habitual Criminals," Art. 709) which provides
that "Any person who, after having
been convicted, within this State,
of a felony, or of an attempt to
commit a felony, or who, after having been convicted under the laws
of any other State, government, or
county, of a crime which, if committed within this State, would be
a felony, commits any felony, within this State, upon conviction of
such second offense, shall be punished as follows: . . ."
California, New York, Texas,
Michigan, Colorado, and Oregon
among others have similar habitual
criminal statutes; Cal. Penal Code
(Deering, 1937) sec. 644, N. Y.
Penal Law, sec. 1942, Tex. Ann.
Penal Code (Vernon, 1925) Art.
63, Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) sec.
17, 339, Colo. Stat. Ann. Ch. 48,
sec 551, Oregon Code Ann. (1930)
sec. 13-2802. In New York, attempts to commit felonies within a
statute providing for punishment
for fourth or subsequent convictions include attempts which are
no more than misdemeanors, while
the word felony, as used in the
same statute, refers only to crimes
(including attempts) which are
strictly of the grade of felony as
defined by section 2 of the Penal
Law, Stauber v. Larkin, 271 N. Y.

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
S. 305 (1934). Therefore, under
the New York interpretation, the
defendant in the instant case, if
his Canadian crime were declared
an attempt in Louisiana (whether
misdemeanor or felony), would
have been found guilty as a third
offender.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana
interpreted their statute strictly,
however, allowing no deviation
from the formal tenor of the words.
Thus defendant was freed of the
third offender charge because the
Canadian crime did not amount to
a felony in Louisiana. Owing to
the fact that there is no crime of
attempt to commit larceny in
Louisiana, this defendant would
have been guilty of nothing under
that state's laws.
An attempt is an intended apparent unfinshed crime. Graham
v. People, 181 Ill. 477, 155 N. E. 179
(1899). The question of whether
an attempt has been made to commit a crime is determined solely
by the condition of the actor's mind
and his conduct in the attempted
commission of his design, People v.
Moran, 123 N. Y. 254, 25 N. E. 412
(1890). People v. Jaffee, 98 N. Y.
S. 486, affirmed in 185 N. Y. 497
(1906). To constitute attempt to
commit larceny there must be an
overt act which if not intercepted
by some intervening cause would
culminate in larceny, People v. Edwards, 79 Cal. App. 514, 249 Pac.
1090, 1091 (1926). The above definitions and limitations of attempt
were fully satisfied by the act of
the defendant in the principal case
when he got into the automobile,
threw the ignition switch on, and
stepped on the starter. His design
to steal the automobile was frustrated by an intervening agency,
a policeman, but the turning of the
switch certainly was an overt act,

which if not stnnred by an outside
agency would have culminated in
the completed crime.
Therefore the defendant's act in
Canada, although not a felony in
Louisiana by this court's interpretation, actually was, or would have
been an attempt to commit the felony of grand larceny, and would
have resulted in the conviction of
O'Day as a third offender, in any
state wherein an attempt to commit grand larceny is punishable, if
coupled with the New York construction of the statute. This hiatus in the Louisiana law results
in a discriminatory inconsistency
as attempts to commit rape, to steal
automobile parts, and the like are
made criminal acts by statute, and
thus, under the New York rule,
would subject perpetrators of such
acts in other states to the habitual
offender statute if they subsequently committed a crime in Louisiana.
But an attempt to steal an automobile as in the instant case is not an
offence within the purview of the
statute. Perhaps the legislature
will plug this loophole by a suitable statute.
LEO BULLINGER.
INDICTMENT-PARTICULARITY NECESSARY.-[Missouri] Defendant, a
city mayor and chief officer of public safety, was charged with misconduct and negligence in office for
having willfully and knowingly
neglected his official duty by taking
no action against gambling houses
and bawdy houses which he knew
to be operating in the city. The
indictment omitted to include exact
information concerning the location of the houses or the names of
their operators, merely identifying
the gambling houses as located "in
certain buildings situated upon
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certain streets and highways of can prepare his defense, if it will
said city, known and designated as guide the court in deciding quesMain Street near the intersection tions of the admissibility of eviof Seventh Street, the exact nu- dence and in pronouncing judgment
merous street locations being to in the event of conviction, and if
this Grand Jury unknown," and defendant's conviction or acquittal
using similar wording in describing on this charge will be a bar to anthe location of the brothels. In the other prosecution for the same oftrial court, there was a judgment fense. Mundy v. Commonwealth,
sustaining a motion to quash the 161 Va. 1049, 171 S. E. 691 (1933),
indictment; upon appeal by the City of Seattle v. Proctor, 183
state the judgment was affirmed. Wash. 299, 48 P. (2d) 241 (1935),
The indictment was defective be- People v. Farson, 244 N. Y. 413,
cause too indefinite in not describ- 155 N. E. 724 (1927).
As Bishop points out in his Criming with reasonable accuracy the
location of any one of the houses inal Procedure, volume II, sections
or describing any individuals con- 517 et seq., these requirements for
nected with them. State v. Maher, certainty in the indictment are
, 124 S. W. (2d) 679
... Mo ...
grounded in sound reason. Every
defendant is innocent in the eyes
(1939).
At common law criminal indict- of the law until convicted, and
ments were required to conform should be given full and fair
to very strict standards both as to notice of what is charged against
the form of indictment and sub- him so that he may have every
stance of the charge therein. But chance to prove his innocence to
by the modern interpretation, no the court. He can know only what
indictment is held to be insufficient appears in the indictment, so that
by reason of imperfection of form instrument should allege every fact
alone, if the substantial rights of which is material to the proceedthe defendant are not prejudiced ings.
The indictment in the instant
Still, the indictment returned by
the grand jury is required to iden- case was based upon Section 3950,
tify with certainty the charge Rev. Stats. Mo. 1929, which reads,
against the defendant. The sixth in part: "Every officer or person
amendment to the Federal Con- holding any trust or appointment,
who shall be convicted of any willstitution and most state constitutions contain provisions to this ef- ful misconduct or misdemeanor in
fect. Section 22 of Article II of office, or neglect to perform any
the Constitution of the State of duty enjoined on him by law,
where no speciil provision is made
Missouri applies in the instant case:
for the punishment of such mis"In criminal prosecutions the acdemeanor, misconduct, or neglicused shall have the right . . . to
demand the nature and cause of hence, shall be punished . .. ."
the accusation . . . ." The courts But an indictment for a statutory
offense which merely follows the
have generally construed such constitutional provisions to mean that language of the statute is not good
an indictment is sufficiently certain unless it charges the offense with
if it so identifies the charge against precision and certainty, and leaves
the defendant that he is clearly no room for doubt of the exact ofapprised of the offense alleged and fense intended to be charged.
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Jarl v. United States, 19 F. (2d)
891 (1927). It is permissible under
some circumstances to allege in an
indictment that some facts are unknown to the grand jury, but this
is only justifiable on grounds of
reasonable necessity-which does
not include a case such as this
where the grand jury leaves out
facts which they could have ascertained and which were essential to
the charge made. State v. Stowe,
132 Mo. 199, 33 S. W. 799 (1896).
Though the indictment in the present case used the words of the statute it was nevertheless not sufficiently specific, for it described the
houses, knowledge of which defendant is alleged to possess, in
such ambiguous and indefinite
terms that defendant could prepare
virtually no defense. Further, because of the large and vaguely described area referred to in the indictment, it would be difficult to
plead defendant's acquittal or conviction in bar of future proceedings
of the same sort which might be
based on the identical fact situation.
Finally, the judge and jury could
not tell whether the evidence produced at the trial proved what the
indictment so indistinctly alleged.
This case clearly falls within the
rule requiring certainty of indictment, and the rule is supported
here by reason as well as precedent.
In similar cases charging malfeasance of public officers in neglecting to act against known gambling houses and houses of prostitution, indictments have been
held sufficient which identified the
houses by street and number.
State v. Castle, 75 N. J. L. 187, 66
Atl. 1059 (1907), People v. Herlihy,
66 App. Div. 534, 73 N. Y. S. 236
(1901), State v. Boyd, 196 Mo. 52,
94 S. W. 536 (1906).
An indictment charging this

same offense of official misconduct
has been held sufficiently definite
which alleged that the mayor, captain of police, and chief of police
unlawfully conspired and agreed
with a certain named person, operator of houses of ill fame, to allow the operation of houses of prostitution "at various places in the
city of Hamtramck."
People v.
Tenerowicz et al., 266 Mich. 276,
253 N. W. 296 (1934).
The particularity required in an
indictment for malfeasance in office
depends of course upon the nature
of the exact misconduct charged.
In Turner v. State, ... Ga. ... , 199
S. E. 837 (1938), transferred 185
Ga. 432, 195 S. E. 431 (1938), the
defendant and another city policeman were indicted for accepting a
bribe from a certain named person
to refrain from arresting persons
unknown to the grand jurors for
violating the lottery law, and for
furnishing police protection to such
persons. It would at first glance
seem that this indictment was insufficient for not naming the persons conducting the lottery nor
specifying what kind of lottery was
conducted; but the indictment was
rightly held sufficiently definite
since the nature of the lottery and
the operator's name were merely
incidental to the bribery charge.
Another indictment was held adequate which charged a commissioner of city works generally with
conspiring with a certain named
person to willfully omit, neglect,
and violate his duty as commissioner. In addition, five specific
acts in furtherance of the conspira.
cy were listed, with the time and
place and the name of the city's
contractor upon whom, according
to the plot, tribute was to be levied
by the conspirators. This was held
sufficiently to individuate the of-
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fense charged. People v. Willis et
al., 158 N. Y. 392, 53 N. E. 29(1899).
An unusual case in which a surprisingly indefinite indictment was
upheld as valid was Castle v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 561, 24 S. W.
(2d) 298 (1930). There the indictment charged that a constable
took money from "various and
divers persons whose names are
unknown to the grand jury" for
the purpose of preventing their
prosecution, "thereby obstructing
public justice, amd violating the
oath of his office." If the charge
was true, this was clearly an offense under the Kentucky statutes.
A bill of particulars was filed which
gave in detail a particular transaction in which the constable accepted a bribe. Although the original indictment was couched in
general terms, the court said it was
definite enough and "the filing of
the bill of particulars did not cure
a defective indictment, but only
aided a good one." This is a singular decision, however, with
which most courts would probably
not agree.
The courts, in order to protect
public officers from indefinite and
ambiguous charges of neglect of
their official duty, have generally
inspected indictments very closely
to insure that they are sufficiently
complete in their charges. It would
seem that groups attempting to reform their city governments will
need more thatn general information, for the grand jury must include in the indictment definite and
specific instances of malfeasance in
order to sustain a charge of misconduct in office.
JAMES CLEMENT.

OPTIONAL, ALTERNATIVE, AND CON-

DITIONAL SENTENCS.-[New

York]

Defendant plead guilty to a charge
of speeding in violation of a city
ordinance. The court sentenced
him to pay a $60 fine. However
the sentence was to be suspended
entirely if the defendant left his
driver's license with the court for
a period of 60 days, or suspended
in part if a public liability insurance policy was filed with the
court. On appeal to the county
in criminal
court it was held:
prosecution, the court must determine the sentence and has no
power to make it optional with the
defendant; a sentence must be certain and definite and, in absence of
statute authorizing it, must not be
in the alternative. Nevertheless
the conviction was sustained, the
county court reducing the fine to
$10 and striking off the conditions
imposed.
City of Rochester v.
Newton, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 441 (1938).
The main objection was lodged
against the public liability condition. Section 2188 of the Penal
Code provides that on conviction
the court may suspend sentence or
impose sentence and suspend the
execution of judgment. Under this
section, if sentence is imposed and
execution of judgment is suspended,
the authority of the court is confined to suspension of the entire
sentence, not merely part of it.
Ex Parte Kuney, 5 N. Y. S. (2d)
By permitting the
644 (1936).
cost of the policy to be deducted
from the fine, the court suspended
only part of the sentence, contrary to the rule in the Kuney case.
Even assuming this statute nonexistent, the court admitted no
power to require the defendant to
take out an insurance policy, for
the legislature had not enacted a
law compelling automobile liability
insurance. It has been often held
that the diminution or termination
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judges, as is evidenced in the instant case.
Many states have abrogated the
common law rule, authorizing alternative sentence by statute, such
as, Illinois-Smith-Hurd Stats. c.
kins, 82 N. C. 68 (1880); Ray v. 38, Secs. 192, 93; Montana-Rev.
State, 40 Ga. App. 145, 149 S. E. 64 Codes 1921 See. 12069; Missouri(1929). In a minority of states, Rev. Stats. 1909 Sec. 8315. Section
however, trial courts are consid- 483 of the N. Y. Code of Crim.
ered to have inherent power to sus- Proc. permits trial courts to prepend execution of sentence on any scribe "such terms and conditions
reasonable condition prescribed. as they may deem best," but, "with
Rayland v. State, 55 Fla. 157, 46 So. the consent of the defendant." No
724 (1928); Scriggs v. City of doubt Sec. 483 is typical of the lanNorth Little Rock, 179 Ark. 200, 14 guage in state statutes which do
S. W. (2d) 1112 (1929). Under authorize conditional sentences.
most statutory systems the crim- An exception is Ill. Rev. Stats.
inal courts are restricted to penal- (Cahill 1937) c. 38, Sec. 812 et seq.,
ties and procedure set out in the where all authorized conditions are
statutes and have no inherent outlined and specifically enumerpower to suspend on condition. In ated. These statutes would appear
re Mills, 135 U. S. 263, (1889);
to provide trial courts with a way
Medjourous v. State, 240 Ohio App. to evade the 'seductive cliches' of
146, 156 N. E. 918 (1924).
the common law.
Perhaps the statutes like that of
The county court was greatly
alarmed at the defendant being New York have given the courts
given an option to fix the amount too much discretionary power. Alof his sentence, or being permitted though the consent of the defendalternative courses of conduct. ant is necessary for a valid susSentences giving a defendant an pension on condition, the defendant
option or alternative course of has little choice but to acquiesce.
conduct have long been con- The fact that defendant in the prindemned. "One of the glories of the cipal case objected and appealed
common law was the fixed characs indeed unusual. The number of
ter of its criminal punishment." 4 appeals in this type of case is quite
Blackstones Comm. 378; 1 Chitty negligible, since the reward of a
Cr. Law (4th Am. Ed. 184) 701. light or suspended sentence is a
"Term of imprisonment or the strong inducement to the convicted
amount of the fine may'not depend defendant to accede to any sugon future contingency." See Holt gestion by the court. The Illinois
K. B. 320 (1700). Per Holt, C. J., statute which authorizes only the
"a fine ought to be absolute and imposition of enumerated condinot conditional." "It is fundamen- tions may be the best solutiQn. For
tal law that the sentence in a crim- without some statutory check on
inal case must be definite and cer- the procedure, the defendant, who
tain." Bishop, Crim. Proc. No. 1309; often cannot appeal from the order
12 Cyc. 779 and cases cited. All of and conviction once he has accepted the suspension (on the thethis terminology has formed a "seductive cliche" that still entraps ory that the suspension is not a
of the sentence may not be conditioned on acts which the criminal
court could not directly order the
convicted defendant to perform.
Smith v. Barrow, 21 Ga. App. 145,
94 S. E. 860 (1917); State v. Per-
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final judgment from which an apDespite the legalistic arguments
peal can be taken-Walther v. .pro and con, the use of such deState, 179 Ind. 565, 101 N. E. 1005 vices by the courts is an informal
(1913)) is subject to the will of attempt to approximate the aims
the trial court. This gives appel- of criminologists in recent years.
late courts practically no oppor- The natural reaction from the futunity to prevent "illegal practices" tile, cast iron, prescribed penal
on the part of trial courts who treatment characteristic of the last
abuse their discretionary power.
century was a movement for the
Whatever may be the extent of development of individualized peso-called "illegal practices," they nal treatment, which was to make
have been condemned as such quite the punishment fit the criminal
ineffectively by the appellate rather than the punishment fit the
courts. In Medjourous v. State, crime. It may be that the reaction
supra, the court said, "the prac- will lead to a thorough reorganizatices which have grown up among tion of our system by which the
trial courts in this state of remit- treatment to be accorded all ofting parts of fines which have been fenders would be conferred on a
imposed, or permitting the accused specially qualified tribunal. Until
to serve less time than provided by that happens the real problem that
law, or serve none at all . . . are
remains is devising appropriate
illegal, contrary to public policy, machinery for the administration
and inimical to the public good. of these minor offenses.
These practices are also a reflecHOWARD A. MCKEE.
tion upon the integrity of the
courts, create a distrust in the
minds of the people, establish a
POWER OF COURTS TO VACATE
lack of uniformity throughout the SENTENCE AFTER PARTIAL ExEcustate in the imposition of sentence TION AND IMPOSE A NEW SENTENCE
for the same offense."
INCREASING THE PUNISHMENT. However trial courts, attempting [Florida]
After conviction on
to effect a complete if rough jus- charge of larceny and sentence
tice in situations involving non- thereunder for 6 months in the
capital offenses, have tempered the county jail, petitioner by his
rigidity of the direct sentencing physician came before the court
power resulting from these restric- asking removal * from jail to
tions "with all sorts of mitigating save petitioner's life for he was
devices . . . running through the suffering from a severe attack
whole course of a prosecution." of pneumonia. The court vacated
See Pound, Foreword: Predictabilsentence and discharged petitioner.
ity in the Administration of Crim- At a subsequent term of court peinal Justice (1928) 42 Harv. L. titioner was sentenced for 2 years
Rev. 297. Some of these trial court under the previous conviction. Pepractices may be technically ille- titioner now alleges that because of
gal, others are merely opportune partial execution of the first senutilizations of discretionary pro- tence the court had no power to
cedure, much of which has sur- revoke it, and thus the sentence
vived from the day when common imposed at the later date was void.
law courts could grant neither an
The Supreme Court held that as
appeal nor a new trial.
a rule a court is without power to
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set aside a criminal judgment after
it has been partly satisfied by the
defendant and impose a new and
different sentence increasing the
punishment, even at the same term
of court at which the original judgment was imposed. But, where the
sentence is vacated during the
same term of court at defendant's
request, and the proposition of imposing a new sentence is deferred
to a subsequent term of court, to
which the case'is considered pending, the court may at the subsequent term of court impose a new
sentence, even increasing the punishment, upon the original conviction. The court then interpreted
the representations of the physxcian as equivalent to a motion by
the defendant to vacate the sentence and held that, as a consequence of that motion, the second
sentence was not void and could
not be attacked by habeas corpus
proceedings. Smith v. Brown, 185
So. 732 (1939). The holding was
directly supported by another Florida case. Rhoden v. Chapman, 127
Fla. 9, 172 'So. 56 (1937).
Whether, in absence of statute, a
court may suspend the pronouncement of a sentence to a subsequent
term is a hurdle that must be
jumped before dealing with the
power of the court to vacate, during term of imposition, a sentence
partially satisfied and impose a
greater one at a subsequent term.
In cases where the pronouncement
of the sentence is delayed for an
indefinite time, or dependent on
the defendant's good behavior, the
courts have rather consistently
held that such suspension deprived
the court of jurisdiction to impose
a sentence at a later term. The
basis of these holdings is that the
court is infringing upon the executive power of pardoning. State v.

Sapp, 87 Kan. 740, 125 Pac. 78
(1912); Grundel v. People, 33 Colo.
191, 79 Pac. 1022 (1906); People v.
Allen, 155 Ill. 61, 39 N. E. 568,
Contra: Ex Parte, Wil(1895).
liams, 26 Fla. 310, 5 So. 833 (1890);
Sylvester v. State, 65 N. H. 193, 20
Atl. 954 (1889). Hawever, when
the pronouncement of sentence is
unconditionally suspended for a
definite time and for some good
cause incident to the administration of justice by the court, the
courts have consistently held that
sentence may be imposed at a subsequent term. For, in these cases,
the purpose is not to pardon or
parole the defendant; but merely
to enable the court to more justly
exercise its power of imposing sentence. Miner v. United States, 244
Fed. 422 (C. C. A. 3d, 1917); In Re
St. Hilaire, 101 Me. 522, 64 Atl. 882
(1906); State v. Ray, 50 Iowa 520
(1879); 25 Harv. L. Rev. 739; 12
Col. L. Rev. 543. Thus, in the instant case, as the deferring of the
pronouncement of sentence to a
subsequent term was in no manner
indefinite or an attempt to exercise
the executive pardoning power, the
validity of the subsequent sentence
cannot be challenged merely because it was imposed at a later
term.
It is generally held that the
judgments, decrees, and orders of
a court are within the control of
the court during the term at which
they were made and may be
amended or altered by the court
during term. 2 Co. Lit. 1st Am.
Ed., See. 438; State v. White, 3 N.
J. M. 1016, 130 Atl. 470 (1925). To
this rule there is a well recognized
limitation; namely, that a court
may not vacate the old sentence
and increase the punishment after
part of the old sentence has been
executed. 44 A. L. R. 1203; 8 R. C.
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L. 244; Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice, 9th ed, Sec. 913.
The reason for this rule is often
said to be that once the prisoner
begins to 'serve his sentence the
court loses its power over his destiny and has no more jurisdiction
over the case. Brown v. Rice, 57
Me. 55 (1869); People v. Meservey,
76 Mich. 223, 42 N. W. 1133 (1889).
Thus the old sentence is void and
the first one still remains in effect.
Brown v. Rice, supra; State v. Cannon, 11 Ore. 312, 2 Pac. 191 (1884);
Turner v. State, 31 S. W. (2d) 809
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930); In Re Sullivan, 3 Cal. App. 193, 84 Pac. 781
(1906). However, the underlying
reason for this generally accepted
limitation to the court's control
over its sentences is that to allow
the defendant to suffer twice under
the same verdict and conviction
would be to put him in double
jeopardy. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U. S.
163, 173 (1874).
That double jeopardy is the only
fundamental reason why the court
cannot set aside its judgment after
partial execution was also pointed
out in a later United States Supreme Court decision in which the
court held that a court could vacate a sentence and mitigate the
punishment after partial execution
of the original sentence. United
States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304, 307
(1931); Note 19 Geo. L. J. 365;
Note 15 Minn. L. Rev., p. 828.
However, many states have also
denied their courts the power to
mitigate punishment after partial
execution of the sentence, on three
different grounds, namely: (1) it
is an infringement on the pardon.ing power of the executive; (2) it
is prohibited by statutory restrictions; (3) the practice of allowing
the court to alter a sentence after
partial execution would be de-

structive to the object of punishment, namely, the reformation of
the offender, as his term of punishment would always be an uncertainty to him. People v. Williams,
352 Ill. 227, 185 N. E. 598 (1933);
Com. v. Mayloy, 57 Pa. 281 (1868);
Brabandt v. Com., 157 Ky. 130, 162
S. W. 786 (1914); 15 Minn. L. Rex.
828; 19 Geo. L. J. 365; 22 J. C. L.
591.
It is logical to say that in those
jurisdictions where the court is not
allowed to VJacate a sentence partially served, on motion of defendant and during the same term of
court, and impose a lighter sentence because of any of the reasons above given, they would not
be allowed to vacate the old sentence and impose a new one inflicting a greater punishment, even on
motion of the defendant to vacate
the old sentence. But, what would
be the action of those courts that
recognize that the foundation of the
rule is the double jeopardy in
which defendant is placed, and that
have no statutes on the subject?
Would they, as the Florida court
did in the instant case, hold that
the defendant had waived his right
not to be placed in double jeopardy
by moving for the old sentence to
be vacated; and, consequently, the
court, under its common law power
to alter sentences during term time,
could impose a sentence inflicting
greater punishment on the defendant?
In the case of Emerson v. Boyles,
170 Ark. 621, 280 S. W. 1005 (1926),
the defendant, after partial execution, was by order of the court,
and with full approval and on motion of defendant, to be released
on his good behavior. The Supreme Court of the state held that
the trial court had no power to
authorize the release: "for the rea-
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son that to permit the judgment to
be set aside and another sentence
to be imposed some time in the future, after the first sentence had
been partially executed, would, in
effect put the defendant in jeopary
twice for the same offense." Here,
although it may be questioned
whether the mere putting the defendant in a position where his
punishment may later be increased
is to place him in double jeopardy,
it is clear that the court does not, in
any manner, consider the consent
of the defendant to the vacating of
the original sentence as a waiver
of his right not to be placed in
double jeopardy.
However, assuming that one may
waive his right not to have punishment already partly executed
be increased by the court, can a
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motion to vacate the sentence be
considered as a waiver of that
right? The increasing of the sentence, that is the infliction of the
new increased sentence, is the
double jeopardy, not the vacating
of the old sentence. Benz v. United
States, supra; Ex Parte Lange, supra; In Re Brittain, 93 N. C. 587
(1885). Consequently, it seems to
be a frank contradiction of facts
to contend that a person has
waived his right not to be placed in
double jeopardy by moving for
a sentence to be vacated when it is
not the vacating of the sentence
that constitutes the double jeopardy, but the later imposition of
the new sentence increasing the
punishment.
JOHN OVERBECK.

